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Economic Rationality, Empathy, and 
Corporate Responsibility 
Jeanne L. Schroeder* 
Kant v. Economic Rationality 
To me, the most interesting portion of Larry Mitchell's book, Corporate 
Irresponsibility, 1 is his Kantian criticism of the concept of corporate "per-
sonhood"." To oversimplify, Kant maintains that personhood is nothing but 
the capacity of self-determination-the possibility of determining one's own 
ends.2 According to Mitchell, corporations completely lack this capacity be-
cause their ends are imposed upon them by corporate law or economic pres-
sures.3 That is, corporations and their managers are supposed to maximize 
profits. Consequently, the law of corporations is internally inconsistent. On 
the one hand, it claims to treat corporations as legal persons, while, on the 
other hand, it strips corporations of even the possibility of Kantian per-
sonhood.4 I wish to chide Mitchell, however, for not following his argument 
to its logical extreme.5 The proposition that the corporation's sole goal is 
profit maximization, and the conflation of profit maximization with share-
holder value maximization, of course, does' not come from corporate law, per 
se, but from market forces and from the law-and-economics paradigm of cor-
porate behavior that became predominant in the 1990's. Mitchell's analysis, 
however, should not be limited to this paradigm in the corporate context be-
cause it is equally applicable to almost the entire body of American law-and-
economics literature. According to Judge Richard Posner and his followers, 
* Visiting Prof. of Law, The George Washington University Law School, Washington, 
D.C.; Professor of Law, The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York 
City. 
1 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EX-
PORT (2001). 
2 Id. at 32-33, 72-73. 
3 Mitchell writes: 
Yet the assumptions that underlie liberalism and ground our Constitution and our 
laws cannot sensibly be applied to the corporation. . . . Thus the corporation as a 
wholly artificial being lacks the motivational capacities of a real person as well as 
the ability, so fundamental to liberal theory, to choose and pursue ends for itself. It 
lacks the moral framework of a natural person. 
Id. at 42-43. 
4 "So we have the paradox of having created an artificial creature with all of the rights of 
natural persons to formulate and pursue ends that give its life meaning, but without the ability to 
choose and pursue those ends." Id. at 44. 
5 I also believe that Mitchell is much too quick to accept both that corporations as artifi-
cial persons in fact heartlessly engage in profit maximization and that natural persons have a 
natural capacity for moral action. As I shall mention in passing below, from the perspective of 
the speculative philosophic tradition that began with Kant, human subjects are artificial cre-
ations of the law, just as much as corporations. Moreover, all economic activity-corporate or 
individual-has a fundamental erotic aspect. See generally JEANNE LoRRAINE SCHROEDER, THE 
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE (1998) [hereinafter 
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES]. 
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not only corporations, but all economically rational actors are non-persons, 
from a Kantian standpoint. That is, they act instrumentally to achieve their 
pre-given irrational ends, but have no rational capacity for choosing their 
ends.6 Because ends are considered entirely irrational, they are treated as 
pre-given.7 As I have written extensively elsewhere,8 neo-classical price the-
ory evidences an essential fear and loathing of the freedom that Kant thinks 
is the essence of personality.9 
For Kant, the concepts of rationality, freedom and morality are so 
closely intertwined that they are practically three different names for the 
same thing, or, perhaps more accurately, they form a holy trinity-rationality 
being the process of choosing of ends, freedom being the capacity to choose 
one's ends, and morality being the ends that one rationally and freely 
chooses.1° Consequently, Posner's recent vicious attacks against neo-Kantian 
moral theory11 is consistent with his economic analysis of law. The free per-
son has no place in his vision of "law and economics."12 
lndef;!d, economic rationality (the identification of means to a pre-given 
ends) is not only a denial of Kantian rationality (the identification of ends), 
but is the opposite of Kantian freedom. Economic rationality is in thrall or 
servitude to irrational ends, or what Kant calls "pathology." Consequently, 
law and economics, from a Kantian perspective, is fundamentally immoral. 
Altruism and Personhood in the Market 
What I want to question today, however, is Mitchell's call to inject cer-
tain emotions into corporate decision-making. Mitchell thinks that the cor-
porate fiction separates corporate managers from their empirical humanity, 
6 "Rationality means little more to an economist than a disposition to choose, consciously 
or unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends the chooser happens to have . .. . It does not 
assume consciousness; it certainly does not assume omniscience." RICHARD A. PosNER, Eco. 
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; see Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodoiogy, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351 (2001). 
7 Consequently, as Posner admits, the assumption of economic rationality is, in fact, de-
pendent on an assumption of irrationality. He states: "preferences cannot be divorced from 
emotion, or emotion from their stimuli, and so instrumental reasoning cannot be thought per-
vaded with irrationality merely because a frequent goal of such reasoning is a preference that we 
would not have if we were not emotional beings." Richard A. Posner, Behavioral Economics 
and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1554 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Behavioral Economics]. 
8 See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality and Le-
gal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Stumbling Block]. 
9 Id. at 265-67. 
10 Id. 
11 See generally RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THE-
ORY (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 1638 (1998). 
12 Consequently, as Posner's economic theory is incapable of recognizing moral theory, 
and therefore moral personality, Posner is incapable of distinguishing between man and beast. 
In Posner 's formulation, "it would not be a solecism to speak of a rational frog," POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANAL Ys1s, supra note 6, at 17, or of a rational rat: "Rats are at least ·as rational as human 
beings when rationality is defined as achieving one's ends (survival and reproduction, in the case 
of rats) at least cost." Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 7, at 1551. 
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and he seeks a way to insert empathy back into the market.13 In contrast, I 
am going to argue that it would be a good thing if, in fact, corporate manag-
ers were stripped of their particular emotions. Indeed, this is the whole pur-
pose of markets in a democratic society. Consequently, I think the problem 
with the economic analysis of corporate law is the opposite, or reverse, of 
Mitchell's analysis. It allows managers to indulge their particular emotions, 
while clothing them in the rhetoric of objectivity-namely profit maximiza-
tion. To me, this is the moral of the Enron debacle-and this might be the 
intractable problem of law and capitalism. 
First, I want to emphasize that I work within the speculative philosophic 
tradition that springs from Kant, continues through Hegel and, in the twenti-
eth century, includes the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. This tradi-
tion rejects the liberal distinction between rationality, on the one hand, and 
emotions, on the other. Rather they are two sides of the same coin-mutu-
ally constituting one another. Consequently, not only is all subjectivity-not 
merely corporate subjectivity-considered to be legal in nature, but law and 
markets are revealed to be fundamentally erotic.14 I question, however, the 
express injection of the emotions of empathy and compassion into the corpo-
rate context on both theoretical and empirical grounds. My argument relies 
on two analyses of markets that are usually thought of as being totally dis-
tinct: Hegel's Philosophy of Right15 and Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sen-
timents,16 as explicated in Ronald Coase's wonderful essay, Adam Smith's 
Theory of Human Nature .17 
We, as human beings, take on different roles, and engage in different 
relations in different contexts; the exact interplay of rationality and desire 
may, thus, be different in different contexts. Mitchell suggests that corpora-
tions and their managers should act more like individuals do in their personal 
lives. But, is this a good idea? Hegel and Smith suggest not. 
Hegel agrees with liberal philosophers like Locke and Hobbes that the 
so-called state of nature (i.e., the hypothetical abstract autonomous individ-
ual before the development of law and society) is characterized by particular 
egoism. He was, however, wary of extrapolating from this hypothetical. For 
example, Hegel argues that the private realm of family and friendships is, 
both empirically and logically, appropriately characterized by particular al-
truism. We love specific individuals for particular, concrete reasons that tran-
scend self-interest. 
Hegel suggests, however, that "abstract right" -private law ( contract 
and property) and markets-is, and should be, characterized by a regime of 
13 This is the thrust o f Chapter 2 of Part 1 of Corporate Responsibility entitled The Perfect 
Externalizing Machine. MITCHELL, supra note 1, a t 49. 
14 JEANNE LoRRAINE SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF V ENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MAR· 
KET (forthcoming 2003); SCHROEDER, T HE V ESTAL AND THE F ASCES, supra note 5. 
15 G .W.F. HEGEL, E LEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W . Wood ed., H .B. 
Nisbe t trans. , 1993). 
16 ADAM SMITH, T HE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. R aphael & A.L. Macfie 
eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) [here inafter SMITH, Mo RAL SENTIMENTS]. 
17 R.H. Coase, Adam Smith's View of Man , 19 J . L. & EcoN. 529 (1976). 
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universal egoism as both an empirical and a logical matter. That is, it is not at 
all inappropriate for market participants to act out of self-interest.18 
Hegel does not merely contrast the market, which is characterized by 
abstract right, with the pre-moral state of nature and the family, which is 
characterized not by right or mere morality but ethical life. Hegel thought 
that the modern constitutional, liberal state, which is also located in the 
realm of ethical life, was an even more developed set of intersubjective rela-
tions. The liberal state is appropriately characterized by universal altruism. 
The state's role, therefore, is not to surpass the market-as abstract right 
plays an essential role in the creation of subjectivity-but to play a temper-
ing, and restraining role. 
This fact means that empathy and care cannot be expected to replace 
market forces within the market. We want a market because the market 
serves both an economic and a political function. 
Here I would like to try to explain what I think the Hegelian insight is 
through Smith. 
Coase maintains that mainstream economists are incorrect in thinking 
that Smith's theory rests on the assumption that individuals are the atomistic, 
self-interested, economically rational profit maximizers that inhabit the uni-
verse of price theory.19 Although Smith thought that individuals were moti-
vated by "self-love," Smith agrees with Hegel that self-love could only be 
atomistic in some hypothesized state of nature before relationships, markets 
and government. That is, particular egoism could only exist outside of rela-
tionships-in the hypothetical liberal state of nature. Actual human beings, 
however, are located within families and other personal relationships. In the 
real world, self-love includes our empathy for, and desire to care for and 
protect, our loved ones.20 
Smith, like Hegel, worries not only about extrapolating from the theo-
retical state of nature to family and other intimate relationships, but also 
about extrapolating from our experiences in the family to the market and to 
the state. Smith, like Mitchell, recognizes that our instinct to care is strongest 
with respect to our immediate families and close friends, and that the instinct 
dissipates with distance.21 Mitchell, coming from a Humean perspective, sug-
gests that care comes from empathy-from recognizing others as being like 
ourselves.22 We tend not to care about those who are distant because we 
18 Although Hegel's vision of abstract right might initially have much in common with that 
of price theory, there is a crucial difference. Legal economists assume that all human relations-
including the family and the state-are essentially the same as the market. Hegel thought that 
the market played an essential role, but that it was fundamentally different from these other 
relationships. 
19 See Coase, supra note 17, at 529. 
20 "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it." SMITH, MoRAL SENTI· 
MENTS, supra note 16, at 9. 
21 "Space and time separate us from others. They interfere with our caring mecha-
nisms .. .. " MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 40. 
22 Id. at 38-39. As I shall discuss at the close of this essay, Mitchell's reliance on Humean 
morality is troublesome given his earlier reliance on Kant's theory of personality as rationality 
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literally do not see them.23 We need to find a way to make the presence of 
the distant felt so that we can empathize and care about them. 
Smith similarly "makes sympathy the basis for our concern for others. 
We form our idea of how others feel by considering how we would feel in like 
circumstances. . . . (B]y an act of imagination we put ourselves in their 
place, .... "24 Smith, however, gives an account of how we come to care so 
strongly about those who are close to us. Love and empathy are normally the 
natural result of a "common humanity (that] leads us to identify with 
others."25 Love, thus, is an achievement, created through habitual interrela-
tionships of mutual dependence with other concrete individuals. In Lacanian 
terms, love is symbolic and legal. This means that the empirical emotion of 
altruism is always particular altruism felt for particular individuals. As a re-
sult, the more intimate we are with another person, the more likely, as an 
empirical matter, that we will feel love or sympathy for and empathy with 
that person. As a result, as an empirical matter our first and greatest loves 
are for our parents-on whom we depend-and our children-who depend 
on us. This love tends to be followed by close affection for siblings and other 
family members with whom we live.26 We tend to feel less affection for more 
distant relatives whom we see less frequently.27 Self-love can also cause us to 
feel strong affection toward friends, and even professional colleagues, with 
whom we have long term relationships of mutual caring, reciprocal behavior 
and habitual intimacy.28 Even more distant and abstract relationships-such 
(the process of determining one's end) and freedom (the capacity to determine one's end). Not 
only did Kant believe that, his theory of rationality and freedom necessarily requires his theory 
of morality. He specifically offered his theory of freedom as a refutation of Hume's empiricism. 
23 "We tend to identify most readily with those who are close to us. " Id. at 39. He 
continues: 
Id. 
In a large and diverse society like that of America, most of us are only dimly aware 
of the existence as people of those outside our circles. . . . But mostly we don't 
think about them at all. Because of this separation, our appreciation of their vul-
nerability, and our correspondent ability to care, becomes tenuous. 
24 Coase, supra note 17, at 529. 
25 MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 38. 
26 ln Smith's words, "After himself, the members of his own family, those who usually live 
in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and sisters, are naturally the 
objects of his warmest affections." SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 16, at 219. 
27 Smith states: 
The children of brothers and sisters are naturally connected by the friendship 
which, after separating into different families, continues to take place between their 
parents. . . . As they seldom live in the same family, however, though of more 
importance to one another, than to the greater part of other people, they are of 
much less than brothers and sisters. As their mutual sympathy is less necessary, so 
it is less habitual, and therefore proportionally weaker. The children of cousins, 
being still less connected, are of still less importance to one another; and the affec-
tion gradually diminishes as the relation grows more and more remote. 
Id. at 220. 
28 Smith writes: 
Among well-disposed people, the necessity or conveniency of mutual accommoda-
tion, very frequently produces a friendship not unlike that which takes place among 
those who are born to live in the same family. Colleagues in office, partners in 
trade, call one another brothers; and frequently feel towards one another as if they 
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as the commonality of living in the same city, or belonging to the same ethnic 
group-can cause feelings of interdependence and empathy. These feelings 
are less strong than those we feel towards family and friends, but greater than 
those we feel towards "foreigners." 
In other words, Smith and Hegel would think that Mitchell is incorrect in 
suggesting that "space and time . . . interfere with our caring mecha-
nisms ... . "29 Rather, they thought that intimacy, proximity and immediacy 
were the caring mechanism. 
To put this in Hegelian terms, personality is created by intersubjective 
recognition.3° Consequently, those with whom we have better relationships 
and more opportunities for intersubjective recognition are more important to 
us. As Smith puts it (when discussing man's affection for family members): 
"He is more habituated to sympathize with them. He knows better how 
every thing is likely to affect them, and his sympathy with them is more pre-
cise and determinate, than it can be with the greater part of other people."31 
Families and friendships, in other words, are based on particular, not 
universal, altruism. Even though we may believe as a moral or philosophical 
matter that we should love all of mankind in the abstract, as an empirical 
matter we feel actual love and affection for particular persons, and we do so 
for very good reasons. Consequently, it follows that the fewer particular per-
sonal contacts we have with a person, and the more distant the relation, the 
less emotional attachment we will have to them. 
As Coase puts it: 
Benevolence is highly personal and most of those who benefit from 
the economic activities in which we engage are unknown to us. 
Even if they were, they would not necessarily in our eyes be lovable. 
For strangers to have to rely on our benevolence for what they re-
ceived from us would mean, in most cases, that they would not be 
supplied: " ... man has almost constant occasion for the help of this 
brethren, and it is in vain to expect it from their benevolence 
only."32 
Consequently, an economic system based on "an ethic of care" is not 
likely to result in the more humane world that Mitchell seeks. When people 
act out of an actual feeling of empathy, they will inevitably favor family and 
friends over strangers, and favor those they recognize as like themselves over 
those they see as different. Indeed, Smith and Hegel were arguing from, 
what was to them, recent historical experience. Government based on care is 
called feudalism-when all rights and wealth depended on the degree of 
blood and personal relationship to one's lord. As Coase notes: 
really were so. . . . Even the trifling circumstances of living in the same 
neighbourhood, has some effect of the same kind. 
Id. at 223-24. 
29 MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 40 (emphasis added). 
30 See generally SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 5. 
31 SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 16, at 219. 
32 Coase, supra note 17, at 544 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE 
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 14 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937)). 
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A politician, when motivated by benevolence, will tend to favour his 
family, his friends, members of his party, inhabitants of his region or 
country ( and this whether or not he is democratically elected). Such 
benevolence will not necessarily redound to the general good. And 
when politicians are motivated by self-interest unalloyed by benevo-
lence, it is easy to see that the results may be even less satisfactory.33 
Smith and Hegel, writing at the dawn of the capitalist market and the 
liberal state, were concerned precisely about how individuals and society 
could free themselves from the shackles of feudalism, which conflated the 
individual, the family, economics and the state. 
Moreover, if actual empathy is created by proximity and perceived simi-
larity and interdependence, then we should also expect that markets and gov-
ernments based on affection will have a tendency not merely towards 
patriotism, but also towards racism and xenophobia. In Smith's words: 
Every individual is naturally more attached to his own particular 
order or society than to any other. His own interest, his own vanity, 
the interest and vanity of many of his friends and companions, are 
commonly a good deal connected with it: he is ambitious to extend 
his privileges and immunities-he is zealous to defend them against 
the encroachments of every other order of society.34 
That is, "the force of benevolence becomes weaker the more remote and 
the more casual the connection. And when we come to foreigners or mem-
bers of other sects or groups with interests which are thought to be opposed 
to ours, we find not simply the absence of benevolence but malevolence. "35 
As Coase points out, Smith (and I would add, Hegel) does not believe 
that the particular affection one feels towards family and friends is misplaced. 
But they argue that an economic system based on benevolence will inevitably 
leave others behind because it is empirically impossible for any individual to 
engage in the type of interrelations that lead toward actual sympathy with 
many people.36 As Coase explains: "For strangers to have to rely on our 
benevolence for what they received from us would mean, in most cases, that 
they would not be supplied: ' ... man has almost constant occasion for the 
help of this brethren, and it is in vain to expect it from their benevolence 
only.'"37 
And, indeed, this is precisely the behavior that seems to have character-
ized Enron. Not because of, but despite their self-serving rhetoric of profit 
maximization, Enron's managers cared primarily about feathering their own 
nests and enriching their friends at the expense of other constituencies-in-
33 Coase, supra note 17, at 544. 
34 SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 16, at 338. 
35 Coase, supra note 17, at 534. 
36 In Smith's words, " (Man) stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance 
of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few per-
sons." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 14 (Edwin Cannan ed. , Modern Library 1937) (hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS}. 
37 Coase, supra note 17, at 544 (quoting SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 36, 
at 14). 
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eluding shareholders and employees. And, let us not forget that in our con-
temporary economy, in which 401(k) plans have largely replaced traditional 
defined-benefit pensions, the distinctions between shareholders and employ-
ees as separate constituencies, on which Mitchell and others, tend to rely,38 
are rapidly breaking down. Those individuals who both lost their jobs and 
saw their retirement accounts wiped out upon Enron's bankruptcy were as-
suredly hurt more in their capacity as shareholders than as employees. 
The "genius" of the market place, according to Smith, is not that it re-
flects the true particular egotistic nature of man, as the law-and-economics 
movement assumes. Rather, it is that the market represses man's particular 
altruistic nature into one public sphere.39 By doing so, the capitalist market 
harnesses self-love so that we, unintentionally, help not only those we care 
about, but those we do not' even know.40 As Coase notes, "[t]he great ad-
vantage of the market is that it is able to use the strength of self-interest to 
offset the weakness and partiality of benevolence, so that those who are un-
known, unattractive, or unimportant, will have their wants served."41 This is 
the meaning of what is probably the most frequently quoted passage in The 
Wealth of Nations: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their 
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages.42 
That is, universal egotism in the market is completely different than the par-
ticular egotism of the state of nature and the particular altruism of the family. 
The implication of Smith's analysis is that the market serves an essential 
role in the creation of the liberal state. As already stated, in feudalism the 
government-which should be universal-was instead characterized by par-
ticularity-empirical altruism is always particular altruism. Croneyism was 
elevated to an ethical value. Democracy, however, requires that all people 
be recognized as equal, so that the rule of law, not the rule of man, prevails. 
A Hegelian analysis brings out an additional point latent in Smith's and 
Coase's analysis. As I have just stated, Smith and Coase argue not only that 
particular altruism is a relatively poor basis on which to supply the populace 
generally with economic goods, but that particular altruism is incompatible 
with a liberal political system based on liberty and equality. Government 
based on particular altruism is feudalism, not democracy. 
38 See, e.g. , MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
39 Coase writes: 
Looked at in this way, Adam Smith's argument for the use of the market for the 
organization of economic activity is much stronger than it is usually thought to be. 
The market is not simply an ingenious mechanism, fueled by self-interest, for secur-
ing the co-operation of individuals in the production of goods and services. 
Coase, supra note 17, at 544. 
40 See id. 
41 Id. 
42 SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 36, at 14. 
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Unsaid, but implicit in Smith's and Coase's analysis, is that just as the 
universal egotism that can be so effective and appropriate in a market is in-
compatible with the very concept of family , it is equally inappropriate as the 
basis of a political system. The state has a monopoly-it does not compete in 
a market place that constrains and channels its greed through iron-fisted in-
visible hands. A universally egotistic sovereign cannot be expected to con-
sider other citizens to be his equal or protect their liberties, let alone care for 
their needs out of benevolence. Rather, if universal egotism were the rules, 
we would permit politicians to contingently and temporarily make common 
cause with certain interest groups to meet their own selfish goals while dis-
tributing the minimum crumbs necessary to maintain their position to the rest 
of society. This is, of course, the cynical view of government offered to us by 
public choice theorists. This view may or may not be an empirically correct 
description of government, but it is not the theoretical ideal of democracy. 
The question for democratic theory is precisely how to squelch these emo-
tions in the public realm in order to approximate this ideal. 
Consequently, unlike Smith, Hegel does not defend the universally 
egotistical market on the practical grounds that it is a more efficient way of 
providing for the material needs of the populace than benevolence. Al-
though Hegel recognized that such pragmatic, consequentialist reasoning has 
its place, it is not the stuff of philosophy. Rather, he argues that the universal 
egotism of the market is logically, not practically, necessary for the develop-
ment of a constitutional democracy. 
Hegel argues, in effect, that the universal egotism of the market-which 
is indifferent to the identity of any particular market actor-enables us to 
develop a regime of universal altruism at the level of the state. A recent 
empirical study resulted in the initially surprising suggestion that people who 
live in developed market economies are significantly more altruistic, gener-
ous and trusting than people who live in traditional cultures.43 Economist 
Samuel Bowles offers a possible explanation for this finding that is similar to 
my thesis: "Markets teach us to behave decently to strangers. . . . Markets 
are an arena in which you encounter somebody you 've never seen before and 
engage in mutually beneficial activity."44 Bowles suggest that this interaction 
is in contrast with traditional societies, in which one does not learn to deal 
with strangers.45 
The theory of a liberal democracy is that the state, including its politi-
cians and its people, should act indifferently between people, at least in the 
sense that all should be treated the same-accorded the same rights and 
charged with the same responsibilities-regardless of their personal charac-
teristics. That is, the ringing words of the Declaration of lndependence- "all 
Men are created equal, .. . endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights"-is not an empirical claim. Indeed, nothing could be more em-
pirically false. Rather, it is a counterfactual offered as an ethical mandate-
society must treat everyone the same despite the fact that every person is dif-
43 David Wessel, The Civilizing Effect of the Market, WALL ST. J ., Jan. 24, 2002, at Al. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
884 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 70:875 
ferent. One should act as though one loves others not because you actually 
feel love for them, and despite the fact that you might feel only loathing for 
them, because it is the ethical thing to do. If we and the state "care" for the 
people, it is not because we feel the particular empirical emotion of love for 
our neighbors; this is not a matter of natural empathy. There is, in fact, noth-
ing less natural to be empathetic to those we do not know. Rather, insofar as 
we care for others, it is partially because the universalization of the market 
helps free us from the particular bonds of the family. Indeed, Kant would go 
so far as to say that if one acts altruistically because of one's empirical emo-
tions rather than out of reason, that act is not moral but, being smeared with 
pathology, is radically evil.46 Hegel believes that the market enables us to 
universalize our empathy beyond those we love. This idea reflects the Hege-
lian dialectic interrelationship between passion and reason. We care for our 
families and friends out of passion-we experience the emotion of love, and 
reason tells us this is proper. But, if we care about our fellow citizens, it 
because it is ethical to do so-we decide to act as though we love them be-
cause reason tells us to. 
And now to return to Kant, who is always the starting place of any He-
gelian analysis. As I have stated, Kant's theory of rationality, freedom, and 
morality are so intimately intertwined that one cannot be understood without 
the others-that is, one cannot apply a Kantian notion of freedom and ra-
tionality without also considering the implications of Kantian moral theory. 
Mitchell attempts to combine Kant's theory of personhood as the freedom 
and capacity to determine one's ends with Hume's empirical theory of empa-
thy. Kant, however, thought that his theory of freedom was a refutation of 
Hume-the stumbling stone on which Hume's philosophy foundered.47 Kant 
thought that morality was the ends that one freely and rationally chooses. 
Kant thought that if an act is taken, not out of reason, but because of one's 
empirical emotions of empathy and compassion, then that act is not moral. 
No matter how good its immediate consequences might be, that act has its 
root (Latin "radix") in pathology, and is, in Kant's terminology, radically 
evil.48 In other words, Hume is an empiricist-he makes morality a matter of 
fact-the experience of empathy. Kant is a radical anti-empiricist. His mo-
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rality is not empirical, or in Kant's terminology, it is not phenomenal, but 
rational or noumenal. 
I, like Mitchell, believe that a just society requires a regime of universal 
altruism that cares equally for the well being of strangers as for friends. I do 
not believe, however, that this goal can be achieved by encouraging corpo-
rate actors to feel empathy-empirical empathy is never universal, and par-
ticular empathy is destructive to the productive capacity of the market. 
Moreover, I do not think we can trust management to manage. Rather, it is 
the state-the realm of abstract universal empathy-that should reign in the 
worst excesses of corporate egotism through substantive regulation. 
I have, thus, come back, by detour through Smith and Hegel, to the great 
twentieth century debate on corporate management associated with Adolph 
Berle and Gardiner Means on the one hand, and E. Merrick Dodd on the 
other. From my perspective, the Berle-Means position is correct at the level 
of the corporation, and the duty of management should be the universal ego-
tism of the corporation-of course, this means the pursuit of profit-not 
share maximization. Dodd is, therefore, incorrect in arguing that corporate 
management should pursue other goals. Dodd, however, is right not about 
corporations, but about society generally. The state should have goals be-
yond wealth maximization. In order to achieve these goals, the state may 
properly reign in the actions of its citizens-both corporations and the indi-
viduals who serve as corporate managers. 
